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Lessons on Monetary Policy from the 1980s
ABSTRACT
Monetary policy events in the United States during the 1980s have ledto
important changes in thinking about monetary policy and in the actualconduct
of policy. The central event in this regard has been thecollapse of
relationships connecting familiar money to both income and prices. The fastest
money growth since World War II, maintained for fully half a decade, occurred
in conjunction with the greatest post-war reduction ininflation. Inflation
predictions based on money growth during this period therefore failed
altogether to anticipate what many observers have regarded as themost
significant monetary policy success of the post-war period. Predictionsbased
on credit aggregates would have fared no better.
Other important changes have resulted from the increasedopenness of the
U.S. economy and the U.S. financial markets. Internationalconsiderations that
previously could have mattered in a policy context, but typically didnot, have
reached macroeconomically meaningful magnitudes in the l980s.The sharp
decline in U.S. competitiveness, following the rise in dollarexchange rates
early in the decade, powerfully affected U.S. nonfinancial economicactivity. The borrowing that the United States has done to financethe resulting trade
deficit has greatly enhanced the role of foreign investors inU.S. markets.
Exchange rates have therefore assumed new importance in the conduct ofU.S.
monetary policy.
Along with exchange rates, short-term interest rates have againemerged as
the principal focus of policy. Economic research wouldprobably prove more
useful in a policy context if economists turned at leastsome of the efforts
they have devoted to trying to resurrect money-income andmoney-price
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The half-decade running from mid 1982 to mid 1987 was a pretty good era
for U.S. monetary policy, as these things go. A sharp easing of policy,
beginning some time around midyear 1982, helped set in motion a recovery from
the most severe business downturn the United States had experienced since the
l930s -- adownturn that tight monetary policy earlier on had deliberately
brought about in order to slow the alarming acceleration of prices. The
recovery that ensued developed into a sustained expansion that continued
without interruption through the end of 1987, thereby setting a new record for
the longest recorded business expansion in U.S. peacetime experience. A fiscal
policy based on unprecedentedly large (and continually growing) structural
budget deficits was a major factor underlying this record-length expansion, but
at least monetary policy did not stand in the way. Just as importantly, the
severe 1981-82 recession served its intended purpose of substantially restoring
price stability, and even after five years of expansion inflation remained
modest by recent historical standards. At least as judged by these outcomes
for the standard objectives of macroeconomic policy, U.S. monetary policy was a
distinct success during these years.
Economists hoping to say something useful about monetary policy have had a
tougher time. The quantitative relationships connecting income and price
movements to the growth of familiar monetary aggregates, including especially
the Ml measure of the money stock that had been the chief focus of monetary-2-
policy during 1979-82, utterly fell apart during this period.1 Moreover, the
collapse of these long-standing empirical regularities was riot merely a matter
of larger than usual quarter-to-quarter or year-to-year variances around
longer-run benchmarks that otherwise continued to be reliable. Double-digit Ml
growth, sustained on average over fully five years, repeatedly led prominent
economists who had relied on these relationships in the past to offerwidely
publicized warnings of an immanent re-acceleration of prices. Yet the
inflation rate fell dramatically, and then remained low. The presumption that
"inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" becameprogressively
less compelling as a substantive rather than merely tautologicaldescription of
the determination of prices.
Economists who preferred to think about monetary policy in different terms
had no more success in fitting the major developments of thisperiod into some
alternative conceptual framework. Relationships connecting income andprices
to the monetary base, or to measures of credit, fell apart just asvisibly as
did those centered on Ml. Although real interest rates declined somewhatfrom
the record levels posted in 1981 and early 1982, they neverthelessremained
historically high throughout the next five years. Yet the economy's rate of
growth in after-inflation dollars was about average for post-war businesscycle
expansions, and in this case the expansion continued on for fiveyears without
even a single negative quarter.
In the meanwhile, the rapidly changing structure of the United States'
international economic position brought importance of a wholenew magnitude to
complications that most economists addressing questions about U.S.monetary
policy had acknowledged often enough in the past, but nonetheless hadusually
ignored in substance. The U.S. current account balance, which hadfrequently-3-
changed sign since World War II but had always remained trivially small in
comparison to the economy's size, suddenly became large enough to matter ina
domestic macroeconomic context. The dollar exchange rate thereforeemerged as
a primary focus of U.S. macroeconomic policy. In addition, just within these
few years the steady string of mounting current account deficits transformed
the United States from the world's largest creditor country to thelargest
debtor. The exchange rate therefore acquired a new importance in the U.S.
financial markets as well.
In the eyes of many economists, the Federal Reserve System has been
steering without a rudder ever since it effectively abandoned its commitment to
monetary growth targets in 1982. The visible success of monetary policy during
the past half-decade is therefore all the more puzzling. In fact, over the
course of this period the Federal Reserve's conduct of monetary policy appears
to have centered ever more closely on controlling short-term interest rates.
Whether this development really means that U.S. monetary policy has now
returned to the conceptual basis of a quarter-century ago, when short-term
nominal interest rates (or their equivalent) were practically the only focus of
the policy process, remains unclear. At the very least, it raises the issue of
whether the blatant flaws that crippled this policy strategy in the past were
inherent and unavoidable. The other side of the same question is what will
happen if the Federal Reserve continues to pursue what is basically an interest
rate strategy, if and when inflation again becomes a major problem.
The 1979-82 Experiment and Its Aftermath
The basic facts describing the conduct of U.S. monetary policy in recent
years are well known, although their interpretation has been the subject of-4-
much disagreement. In October 1979, the Federal Reserve System announced that
it was adopting a new policy strategy placing primary emphasis on reducing over
time the growth of the money stock. Further, to gain better control over money
growth the Federal Reserve would be implementing new operating procedures,
based in the first instance on the stock of nonborrowed reserves rather than
the federal funds rate or some other short-term interest rate. The bands
within which the federal funds rate would be free to fluctuate in the interval
between meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee were accordingly widened
by more than an order of magnitude. Several more narrowly technical measures,
designed in principle to enhance control over money growth, were also part of
the overall package.
The immediate motivation underlying this dramatic move was the rapidly
deteriorating inflation situation, together with growing concerns about the
dollar exchange rate. The overall U.S. inflation rate, as measured by the GNP
deflator, had risen from a post-recession low of 6.4% in 1976 to 8.9% in 1979.
The comparable rise measured by consumer prices was from 4.8% to 13.3%, the
highest rate since 1946. At the same time, dollar exchange rates declined
between 1976 and 1979 by 16.4% on a trade-weighted basis (14.5% after
correcting for differential inflation). Especially once the OPEC cartel
announced yet another major hike in crude petroleum prices, fears of an
uncontrollable inflation spiral or a precipitous decline in the dollar, or
both, began to spread.
Although the Federal Open Market Committee had at least mentioned money
growth targets in its formal policy directives ever since 1970, and had
formally reported money growth targets to Congress since 1975, in practice
there was little correspondence between the stated targets and actual money-5-
growth. Evidence from the 1970s shows that the Federal Reserve did
systematically adjust the federal funds rate in the direction required to
offset deviations of actual money growth from the targets, but that the
magnitude of these adjustments was far too small to be effective for plausible
estimates of the interest elasticity of money demand.2 Perhaps more
importantly, the Committee typically did not set the coming year's targets so
as to make up for past deviations, but instead let bygones be bygones and so
treated each year as independent of the past. As the years rolled on, the
difference between actual and targeted money growth was usually positive, and
the average difference was positive. As a result, the actual rate of Ml growth
gradually drifted upward, from 4.9% per annum during 1965-69 to 6.1% per annum
during 1970-74, and then 7.1% per annum during 1975-79 (although the fastest
growth for any year during this period, 8.4%, occurred during 1972).
The effects of the new combination of policy strategy and policy tactics
implemented in October 1979 were immediately visible, and they continued to be
so for tho next several years, although in some aspects they ran counter to the
new policy's declared intent. At the most basic level, the Federal Reserve did
carry through on its commitment to contain, and then reduce, the growth rate of
the Ml money stock. The rate of Ml growth, measured from the fourth quarter of
one year to the fourth quarter of the next (the same basis used for officially
reporting money growth targets to Congress) had been 8.2% in 1978. The
"gradualist" objective of reducing the money growth rate by one percent each
year, until it reached a level consistent with price stability, would imply
targets of roughly 7% for 1979, 6% for 1980, 5% for 1981, and so on.3
Although Ml had grown at9.0% per annum rate in the first three quarters of
1979, with the sharp policy shift in the final quarter the growth for 1979 as a-6-
whole was 7.9%. A continuation of the new policy delivered 7.3% Ml growth in
1980, and 5.1% in 1981 (see Figure 1). For this three-year period viewed as a
whole, the new policy did manage to achieve results roughly consistent with the
objective of reducing the money growth rate by one percent per year.
Not surprisingly, delivering on this objective involved interest rates
that were both higher on average and also more volatile.4 Nominal interest
rates immediately rose to record highs, and then declined sharply as the
economy entered a recession and the Federal Reserve Board also imposedcredit
controls as authorized by President Carter under the Credit Control Act of
1969. Nominal interest rates then rose to yet new record highs in 1981
after business began to recover and credit controls were no longer in effect.
Interest rates were high in real terms as well. The difference between the
three-month Treasury bill rate and the next quarter's inflation rate, which had
averaged close to zero during the post World War II period up until then,
fluctuated in the 4-8% per annum range throughout 1981 and 1982. Short-run
volatility of interest rates -- month-to-month,day-to-day, and even within the
trading day --increasedby what for most measures were large multiples.
The most striking respect in which the results of the new monetary policy
did not correspond to its declared intent was that the short-run volatility of
money growth increased sharply too. The Federal Reserve's success in gradually
reducing the yearly Ml growth rate --8.2%in 1978, 7.9% in 1979, 7.3% in 1980,
5.1% in 1981 --didnot carry over to the quarterly growth rate, which varied
in the immediate post-1979 period from a high of 21.1% per annum in l980:Q3 to
a low of minus 5.8% per annum in l980:Q2, nor to any finer time calibration.
The standard deviation of Ml growth from one quarter to the next jumped from
2.37% per annum during l970:Ql-1979:Q3 to 6.64% per annum during





















































































































































during the 1980 credit control episode, the increase was only to 3.00% per
annum.) Although the Federal Reserve had never formally acknowledged any
commitment to stabilize money growth on a within-year basis, critics of
monetary policy, both at the time and subsequently, focused on this increase in
short-run volatility as casting doubt on the strength of the central bank's
commitment to money growth targets in a broader perspective.
The monetary policy experiment that commenced in October 1979 ended almost
as abruptly as it had begun. By the summer of 1982 the slowdown in U.S.
business activity had developed into what was, by many measures, the most
severe recession since the great depression of the 193Os. Unemployed labor,
idle industrial capacity and business bankruptcies were all at post-war record
levels. At the same time, bank failures had also reached record levels, and
there were increasing signs of fragility throughout the financial structure.
In August 1982 an impasse over Mexico's ability to meet its dollar-denominated
external obligations called widespread attention for the first item to the debt
problems not just of Mexico but of developing countries throughout Latin
America and sub-Saharan Africa.
Yetthedemand for money balances continued to be strong. Following the
5.1% growth in 1981, the Federal Reserve had set a 2 1/2 -51/2% target range
for Ml growth in 1982. The revised data now available show that actual Ml
growth was within this range (4.6% per annum) during the first half of 1982;
but the data available at that time showed Ml growth running consistently above
the stated target range, despite continuing high interest rates and contracting
real economic activity. In August the Federal Reserve allowed short-term
interest rates to drop by almost three percentage points notwithstanding the
emergence of still more rapid money growth. In October, within less than a-8-
week of the third anniversary of the announcement that had proclaimed the new
dedication to money growth targets, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Voicker
publicly acknowledged that the Ml growth target was no longer in effect. With
a further speed-up in the fourth quarter, Ml growth for the year 1982 came to
8.6% --abovethe target range, above the 1978 growth rate from which the
program of cutting back on money growth had originally begun, and even above
the post-war record growth rate set back in 1972.
The experience of the next five years largely continued the course set in
the latter half of 1982. The yearly Ml growth rate was in double digits in
each of 1983, 1985 and 1986 (see again Figure 1). For the five-year span
ending at mid 1987, the average Ml growth was 10.8% per annum. Only in 1984
did actual money growth fall within the stated target range. In both 1983 and
1985 the Federal Reserve officially changed the target range at midyear, once
the difference between actual and targeted Ml growth became obvious. In 1986
the Federal Reserve suspended its Ml target range without setting a new one.
In 1987 the Federal Reserve simply set no target range for Ml growth at all.
Throughout the post-1982 period the Federal Reserve's official
pronouncements continued to emphasize targets for broader monetary aggregates
in place of Ml, but it is not clear to what extent these measures genuinely
guided monetary policy. Actual M2 growth did fall within the stated target
range in every year between 1983 and 1986.6 Actual M3 growth exceeded the
stated target range in 1983 and 1984, but fell within it in 1985 and 1986. In
1987, until the October drop in stock prices, the Federal Reserve either
instigated or accepted (depending upon one's perspective) rising market
interest rates, and also raised the discount rate, despite the fact that both
M2 growth and M3 growth were falling short of the stated target range; and the
decline of market interest rates immediately after the stock market crash-9-
appeared to have little to do with money growth patterns in any direct way.
By contrast, short-term nominal interest rates since 1982 have resumed the
smooth pattern characteristic of the pre-1979 era, thereby suggesting a renewed
role for interest rates -- asbefore -- atthe center of the monetary
policymaking process. The standard deviation of the month-to-month change in
the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate, for example, had risen from .42% per
annum between January 1970 and September 1979, to 1.54% per annum between
October 1979 and September 1982. It dropped back to .32% per annum between
October 1982 and June 1987. The standard deviation of the month-to-month
change in the federal funds rate rose from .50% to 1.92%, and then fell to
.38%, over the same three periods.
Although some of this return to interest rate smoothness on a
month-to-month basis may simply have reflected the continuity of the business
expansion and the absence of a re-acceleration of prices during this period,
the pronounced stability of short-term interest rates over a substantial span
of time more likely indicates the return to a monetary policy approach based on
closely controlling interest rate movements. At the least, it presents a
strong contrast to the behavior that the Federal Reserve has accepted for the
monetary aggregates.
CollaDse of the Money-Income and Money-Price RelationshiDs
What makes this unusual record of monetary policy actions look so
successful in retrospect is that the bizarre behavior of money growth in no way
corresponded to the behavior of income or prices. The familiar relationships
that had characterized prior experience simply disappeared.
Instabilities in the money-income relationship -- or,in more
sophisticated forms, the money demand function --hadactually begun to become-10-
more pronounced as early as the mid l970s, and their appearance had already
spawned a substantial new body of empirical literature even before the new
monetary policy experiment had commenced in October l979. By 1980 the
Federal Reserve System had already adopted a whole new set of definitions of
the monetary aggregates, designed in part to overcome just such difficulties.
A survey paper bearing the suggestive title "The Search for a Stable Money
Demand Function: A Survey of the Post-1973 Literature," and including more
than eighty references, was already in print in the Journal of Economic
Literature before Paul Volcker acknowledged in October 1982 that the Federal
Reserve was suspending its Ml growth target.8
As Figure 2 makes clear, however, the instability that generated so much
concern and research in the pre-1982 period was small stuff in comparison to
what followed. The figure plots the ratio of the Ml money stock to CUP for
each quarter since the start of the redefined Ml series in 1959:Ql.9 Through
the end of 1980, the Ml-to-CNP ratio displayed the familiar downward trend of
roughly 3% per annum that most students of the money-income relationship had
come to see as inevitable in the post-war period, with a standard deviation
around this trend of only .0044 (in comparison to a l980:Q4 value of .1466).
After 1980 the Ml-to CUP ratio not only experienced wider fluctuations but even
reversed course. A simple extrapolation of the 1959-80 trend implies a ratio
of .1007 by 1987:Q2 (the last quarter plotted). The actual value in l987:Q2
was .1686, different from the trend extrapolation by more than 15 times the
1959-80 standard deviation.
Discussion of this phenomenon at the popular level has typically offered
as an explanation the fact that "velocity" has declined. Because the so-called
income velocity of money is nothing other than the ratio of GNP to money (the

























































































































































































completely empty of content. Given the definition of "velocity" in this
context, the fact that velocity declined is simply identical to the fact that
money grew rapidly while income did not. Saying that money growth outpaced
income growth because velocity declined is like saying that the sun rose
because it was morning.10
The mere fact of instability in the simple money-income ratio need not, of
course, imply instability in more fully specified behavioral representations of
the money-income relationship. The impression that stands out on a first
glance at Figure 2 is representative of the results that researchers employing
a variety of statistical strategies have found, however. A standard
Goldfeld-type money demand function, estimated for quarterly data spanning
1952:Q3-1979:Q3, indicates a standard error of .42%. Extending the sample to
1986:Q4 raises the standard error to .61%. Deleting the earlier data, so that
the sample is 1974:Q2-1986:Q4, further raises the standard error to .84%.
Dynamic out-of-sample simulations of such equations deliver cumulative errors
with root mean squares in the range of 4-8% for different parts of the
post-1982 period, in comparison with 0.5-1.5% for different parts of the
pre-1974 period. Attempts to do better with alternative specifications have
met at best only very limited success.11
The story is approximately the same for efforts to investigate the
money-income relationship from the perspective of determining income rather
than money. A "St. Louis" type equation relating nominal GNP to four-quarter
lags on both Ml and high-employment government expenditures, estimated in
logarithmic differences for quarterly data spanning 1960:Ql-l979:Q3, indicates
an adjusted coefficient of determination (R2) of .32. Extending the sample to
l986:Q4 reduces the 2 to .11. Deleting the earlier data, so that the sample
is 1970:Q3-1986:Q4, further reduces the ft2 to just .02. More sophisticated-12-
autogression methods testing for a significant role of money in "causing"
either nominal or real income, in the sense of accounting for income
fluctuations not already accounted for by prior fluctuations in income itself,
have produced results that are sufficiently varied to generate more skepticism
than confidence in any strong conclusion on the subject, either positive or
negative.12
Finally, in considering the money-price relationship it is even necessary
to be on guard against results that are strongly statistically significant but
with the wrong sign to make any sense in economic terms. The double-digit
average growth rate maintained for five years following mid 1982 represents the
most rapid sustained money growth the United States has experienced since World
War II, yet these same years also saw the strongest sustained deceleration of
prices in the post-war period (see again Figure 1). Price inflation as
measured by the GNP deflator peaked at 9.7% in 1981 and declined in each of the
next five years, reaching 2.6% in 1986. The rate of increase of consumer
prices peaked at 13.3% in 1979 and declined in all but one of the next seven
years, reaching 1.1% in 1986. Given the role that high-variance observations
play in dominating results based on the least-squares methodology, as of the
late 1980s it is necessary to take care not to find results indicating that
faster money growth implies slower inflation.
Two examples, both drawn from the same paper, readily illustrate the
pitfalls that confronted anyone who continued to rely closely on
straightforward money-income and money-price relationships during this period.
First, Figure 3 is an expansion, both backward in time and forward, of a figure
included in a 1984 paper by Milton Friedman in the American Economic
Review.13 The figure plots the respective annualized quarter-to-quarter









































































































































































1960:Ql-1987:Q2 and distinguishes three time intervals. The middle one,
1979:Q4-1983:Q4, is identical to that plotted by Friedman. It spans the period
from the October 1979 inception of the new monetary policy experiment through
what was presumably the most recent observation available as of his time of
writing.
After pointing out that the correlation between these two series during
1979:Q4-l983:Q4 was .46, or .71 after eliminating the two quarters affected by
the credit control episode, Friedman wrote, "Two things are notable about the
relation between money and income in these years: first, the lag is both
shorter on the average and less variable than in earlier years, second, the
relation is unusually close. I believe that both are a consequence of the
exceptionally large fluctuations in Ml growth. The effect was to enhance the
importance of the monetary changes relative to the numerous other factors
affecting nominal income and thereby to speed up and render more consistent the
reaction."
Table 1 summarizes the record of the GNP-to-lagged-Ml growth correlation
and the variability of Ml growth for the three intervals shown in Figure 3.
Money growth on a quarter-to-quarter basis (as used by Friedman in his paper)
was certainly more variable during l979:Q4-l983:Q4 than it had been during the
prior two decades. The GNP-to-lagged-Ml correlation was not "unusually close"
during 1979:Q4-l983:Q4 compared to the past, however. The correlation of .45
computed over these eleven quarters (Friedman reported .46) is essentially
identical to that for the previous 79 quarters: Excluding 1980:Q2 and 1980:Q3
reduces the variability of money growth, but does not materially affect the
GNP-to-lagged money correlation. (Subsequent data revisions have reduced the
.71 correlation reported by Friedman to .47 as shown in Table 1 --identicalto
the correlation for the earlier period.)TABLE 1
MONEY GROWTH VOLATILITY ANDTHE
GNP-TO-LAGGED-M1CORRELATION. 1960-1987
Standard Correlation Between
Deviation of GNP Growth and
Sarntle Ml Growth Lagged Ml Growth
1960:Q1-1979:Q3 2.87% .47
1979:Q4-1983:Q4 6.16 .45
l979:Q4-1980:Ql, 1980:Q4-1983:Q4 4.18 .47
1984:Ql-1987:Q2 4.80 -.10
Notes: Data are seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
Money data are quarterly averages.-14-
More importantly, what stands out in both Table 1 and Figure 3, is the
change that occurred after 1983. Although the variability of money growth
remained high, the positive GNP-to-lagged-Ml correlation disappeared entirely.
In its place is a small negative correlation.
Table 2, focusing on the money-price relationship, is simply an updated
version of a table that Friedman presented in the same 1984 paper. The
horizontal line in each column indicates entries not included in the original
version.14 In describing the data shown above the two lines, Friedman wrote,
"The long-period evidence suggests that inflation has much inertia and that the
lag between money and inflation is of the order of two years. Table [2] shows
that this relation has held in recent years as well. There is a one-to-one
relation between movements in monetary growth, and in the GNP deflator two
years later over successive two-year periods since 1971 ... Theincreased
rate of monetary growth in the 1981-83 biennium suggests that we have passed
the trough in inflation and that inflation will be decidedly higher from 1983
to 1985 than it was from 1981 to l983.l5
As the below-the-line entries in Table 2 show, quite the opposite
happened. Growth of Ml during 1981:Q3-l983:Q3 was the fastest for any of the
six biennia in Friedman's sample, but inflation in 1983:Q3-1985:Q3 turned out
to be the lowest. Rapid money growth continued in l983:Q3-1985:Q3, but
inflation slowed still further in 1985:Q3-l987:Q3. The simple correlation
between the two time series shown, calculated for the first five observations
only, is .70. Calculated for all seven observations, the correlation is
minus .23.
Other Money and Credit Aggregates
The breakdown of long-standing relationships to income and prices has not
been confined to the Ml money measure. Neither M2 nor M3, nor the monetaryTABLE 2
RATES OF CHANGE IN MONEY AND
ININFLATION EICHT OUARTERS LATER
Annual Rate of Change
Over EightQuarters
Notes:Data are seasonally adjusted.
Source: Friedman (1984), updated.
Deflator Eight Period for
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1975:Q3-1977:Q3 6.4 8.3 l977:Q3-1979:Q3










]base, nor the total debt of domesticnonfinancial borrowers has displayed a
consistent relationship to nominal income growth orto inflation during this
period. On a quarter-to-quarter basis,standard relationships like
Goldfeld-tyPe equations fitting movements inthese aggregates to movements of
income and interest rates, or St. Louis-type equationsfitting movements of
nominal income to movements of an aggregate and a measureof fiscal policy,
showed pronounced deterioration for each of these aggregates.(The largest
for any of these St. Louis equations, estimatedfor quarterly data spanning
l970:Q3-l986:Q4, is .09.) On a longer-term basis,the average growth rate for
each of these aggregates during the half-decade from
mid 1982 to mid 1987 was
in excess of any prior post-war experience; yetinflation lessened
substantially, and the average growth of nominal income washardly
extraordinary. By mid 1987 the ratio of each aggregateto nominal GNP was
above the level implied by an extrapolation of the correspondingpre-198O trend
by an amount ranging from three standard deviations(for M2) to twenty-three
(for the credit aggregate), based on the pre-198O variability.It is difficult
to imagine how anyone could have successfully predictedthe behavior of either
income or prices during this period on the basis of foreknowledgeof the path
of any --or,for that matter, all --ofthese aggregates.
The manifest failure of the credit aggregate to performsatisfactorily in
this context perhaps merits a special comment.I had earlier advocated the use
of a broad credit aggregate in conjunction with one or more monetary
aggregates, in formulating U.S. monetary policy, preciselyon the ground that
credit might provide some safeguard against false signals given bythe monetary
aggregates under conditions of instability affectingthe public's demand for
rnoney)6 Because credit is a measure of activity on the liability side of
the public's balance sheet, while themonetary aggregates arevarious measures-16-
of the non-bank public's assets, it seemed (and to me still seems) reasonable
to think that expanding the information base explicitly underlying the monetary
policy process, to encompass both money and credit measures, would provide
potentially useful diversification in the context of portfolio behavior that is
at best imperfectly understood, and inevitably subject to a multiplicity of
shocks. In addition, empirical investigations relying on a variety of
statistical methods indicated little basis for concluding that the total debt
of all domestic nonfinancial borrowers was any less (or any more) closely
related to movements of income or prices than was any of the standard monetary
aggregates
17
In the event, the movement of credit during the post-1982 period bore no
more relation to income or prices than did that of anyof the monetary
aggregates. Worse still, the false signals provided bythe growth of credit
were in the same direction as those provided by the growthof money. Figure 4
plots the credit-to-CNP ratio for the same sample forwhich Figure 2 shows the
M1-to-GNP ratio.18 After decades of trendless stability, the creditratio
began an unprecedented climb in 1982 which has not stopped asof the time of
writing. Moreover, disaggregated data show that essentiallyall categories of
domestic nonfinancial borrowers -- includingthe federal government, state and
local governments, individuals, and businesses --haveplayed major roles in
this extraordinary surge of indebtedness.19 Anyone who hadrelied on prior
credit-based relationships to predict the behavior of income or pricesduring
this period would have made forecasts just as incorrect asthose derived from
money-based relationships. Anyone who had derivedadditional confidence in
such predictions because the respective signals given byboth money and credit



























































































































































I have speculated elsewhere on the causes of the breakdown of the
relationship between credit and income in the 1980s.2° For purposes of the
monetary policy issues under discussion here, it is sufficient to say that
attempts to "fix up" this relationship in any simple way are likely to be no
more successful than such efforts directed at parallel relationships for the
monetary aggregates have been.
A Relationship That Did Hold Up
In sharp contrast to the collapse of relationships connecting the ultimate
objectives of monetary policy to standard quantity measures of policy actions,
the long-standing relationship between the two most prominent macroeconomic
policy objectives -- inflationand unemployment -- remainedintact during this
period. The point is of some interest because one of the principal supposed
merits widely claimed in favor of the use of publicly announced money growth
targets for monetary policy was a potential lessening of the real costs of
disinflation. The idea was that public knowledge of such targets would affect
expectations in such a way as to minimize (according to some models, to
eliminate altogether) the usual negative impact of disinflationary monetary
policy on employment, output, incomes, and profits.
What this idea should have led one to predict about the real costs of the
major disinflation achieved in the United States in the 1980s is far from
clear. For almost three years beginning in October 1979, the Federal Reserve
did approximately carry through on its widely publicized intention to reduce
the yearly rate of money growth by one percent per year -- thatis, as long as
everyone understood that "money" meant Ml. because the familiar claim that
most measures of money move roughly together over time turned out to be false,
however, anyone who watched M2 or M3 instead of Ml would have seen no evidence-18-
of monetary deceleration.21 Moreover, on a within-year basis even Ml growth
became not more regular but less after October 1979 (see again Table 1). After
mid 1982 there was no reason for anyone to find the Federal Reserve's
commitment to its stated money growth targets credible.
Regardless of whether any part of the policy experience of the 1980s
constituted a good test for an effect of pre-announced money growth targets in
reducing the real costs of disinflation, it is clear that no such reduction
occurred. Ten years ago Arthur Okun surveyed a variety of econometric
estimates of these costs, none of which incorporated any expectations effects
due to reliance on pre-announced money growth targets.22 Okun's survey
indicated that the cost of each percentage point reduction in inflation
achieved by monetary policy would be between two and six "point-years" of
unemployment, with a median estimate of three point-years.23 Table 3 shows
the annual rate of change of the GNP deflator and the annual average
unemployment rate beginning in 1978.The table also shows, for years
beginning in 1980, the cumulative excess of the unemployment rate above 6% (the
approximate average for the two prior years, and a standard "full employment"
benchmark).
The slowing of inflation from nearly 10% per annum in 1980-81 to roughly
3% per annum a half-decade later required approximately 14 point-years of
unemployment -- rightat the lower end of the range implied by the econometric
models Okun surveyed. Especially in light of the evidence suggesting that
something like a third (and perhaps as much as a half) of this disinflation was
a product of the 74% appreciation of the dollar's trade-weighted exchange rate
between 1980 and early 1985 -- anappreciation which has been almost entirely
reversed as of the time of writing -- thisresult seems fully consistent with
Okun's prediction.24TABLE 3















































Everyone had always knownthatsufficiently tight monetary policy,
maintained for a sufficiently long time, could halt even the most deeply rooted
inflation. The reluctance to proceed in that fashion lay not in disbelief that
such a policy would do its job, but in concern for the resulting real costs.
What was new beginning in October 1979 was the willingness to bear those Costs.
International Complications
TheUnitedStates is not a small open economy. U.S. production and U.S.
incomes bulk sufficiently large in comparison to the combined economic scale of
all countries participating in the current free international trading system
that independent forces originating in this country can and do affect economic
conditions on a world-wide basis. The U.S. financial markets bulk sufficiently
large in comparison to world capital markets to exert analogous effects.
The United States is an open economy, however, and the increasing
practical importance of this fact is perhaps the most interesting single
development of the 1980s from a monetary policy perspective. There are at
least two major aspects of the U.S. economy's openness that now matter, far
more than earlier on, for purposes of monetary policy. The more
straightforward of the two is simply the demonstrated ability of U.S. exports
and U.S. imports to differ by a margin large enough to affect the economy's
aggregate-level output and growth.
The possibility of such an outcome had always been present, of course; but
throughout the post-war era, until the 1980s, the U.S. current account was
always approximately in balance over periods long enough to even out the ups
and downs of the business cycle. The current account was in surplus, albeit by
less than $1 billion per annum (0.2% of CNP), on average during the l9SOs. In
the l96Os the average annual surplus was $3 billion (0.4% of GNP). In the-20-
1970s the current account was in deficit on average, but by less than
$1 billion per year (not even 0.1% of GNP). In 1980 there was a $2 billion
surplus, compared to overall GNP of $2.7 trillion. It is little wonder that
many analysts of U.S. monetary policy during these decades practically ignored
potential effects on real economic activity via exchange rate channels.
The 1980s have been starkly different. With a 74% appreciation of the
dollar on a trade-weighted basis between yearend 1980 and early 1985 (64% after
allowing for differential inflation rates), together with a host of other
factors that may have further compounded the problem, the ability of many U.S.
industries to compete in world markets all but collapsed. By 1986 the current
account deficit was $141 billion, or 3.3% of GNP. On an overall basis,
including the trade balance, real GNP in 1986 was up over the 1980 level by
16.5%. Excluding the trade balance --thatis, focusing on domestic absorption
rather than production --theincrease over the six years was 23.3%. Not
surprisingly, exchange rate effects on export and import flows have now emerged
as a genuine focus of monetary policy concern, not just a subject for
obligatory mention.
The more complex aspect of the newly enhanced importance of the U.S.
economy's openness from a monetary policy perspective is an outgrowth of the
first. A current account deficit means that a country is borrowing from abroad
to finance the excess of its imports over its exports (where both are broadly
defined) -- or,equivalently, to finance the excess of its domestic investment
and government deficit over its domestic saving. Since 1980 U.S. fiscal policy
has delivered an unbroken string of unprecedentedly large federal government
budget deficits, notwithstanding five years of business expansion beginning in
1983. At the same time, domestic saving has been below average despite the
introduction of a variety of supposed saving incentives. As a result, the-21-
United States has been borrowing from abroad in record volume even though the
share of GNP devoted to net investment in both business and residential capital
has been unusually small. Especially since 1984, the United States has
borrowed from abroad on a larger scale in relation to the economy's size than
the country did at any of the four peak periods of reliance on foreign capital
to finance its canals, then its railroads, then its steel and other industries,
and then its public utilities, during the nineteenth century.25
This massive borrowing from abroad transformed the United States from the
world's largest creditor country to its largest debtor in just four years. The
U.S. net foreign asset position peaked at $141 billion at yearend 1981. It was
still $136 billion as of yearend 1982. The United States officially became a
net debtor again (for the first time since before World War I) in early 1985.
By yearend 1986 the U.S. net foreign debt was $265 billion -- morethan that of
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina combined.26 On a gross basis (that is, without
any balancing of U.S. holdings abroad) foreign holdings in the United States as
of yearend 1986 came to $1.3 trillion, including such readily liquefiable
assets as $267 billion of U.S. Treasury securities, $149 billion of corporate
bonds and other debt securities, $167 of corporate equities, and $477 billion
of bank deposits.27
As a result of this surge in foreign holdings during the 198Os, foreign
investors have assumed an importance in the U.S. financial markets that was
previously unknown in modern times. Whether or not foreign investors will bid
in volume on any given day's auction of U.S. Treasury securities is now often
the paramount focus of atte'tion among participants not just in the U.S. bond
market but in the stock market too. Popular discussions frequently raise the
fear that foreign investors might decide to "get out" of dollar holdings, with
disastrous consequences for the dollar exchange rate as well as for the prices-22-
of dollar denominated securities. The notion that foreign investors in the
aggregate can sell their dollar holdings to anyone but each other is mistaken,
of course, but their attempts to do so can move both exchange rates and
securities prices. In particular, given the size of foreign holdings, a
widespread move to liquidate bond and equity portfolios as a preliminary to
selling dollars (even if only to other foreign buyers) could easily move
securities prices by a substantial margin. As a result, managing dollar
exchange rates so as to prevent such occurrences has added a whole new
dimension of U.S. monetary policy.
The contrast between the rigid hands-off attitude toward the foreign
exchange markets that the Reagan administration espoused during its first four
years in office, and the series of ad hoc international agreements that it has
orchestrated beginning with the widely publicized meeting at New York's Plaza
Hotel in September 1985, is just the most visible part of the increased
importance of the exchange rate for the United States. Although there is
little hard evidence as yet, it appears that the change has affected U.S.
monetary policy in more ongoing, and more subtle, ways as well. For example,
even at the simplest level it is no longer so obvious that an open market
purchase which lowers short-term interest rates will necessarily lower
long-term interest rates as well. If dollar exchange rates fall as a resultof
lower U.S. short-term rates, foreign investors may sell their long-term U.S.
assets as a preliminary to reducing (again, not collectively) their overall
dollar holdings, and domestic market participants may seek to do the same in
anticipation of the action by foreign investors.28
If the net result of these developments amounts to an erosion of
sovereignty over U.S. monetary policy, that loss is no more than theinevitable
price of becoming a debtor country --andthe world's largest, at that. Losing-23-
control over one's affairs is part of what a mounting debt level is all about,
no less for a borrowing nation than for business or individual borrowers. The
policy actions and public discussions that ensued after the October 1987 stock
market crash dramatically illustrated the tension that can arise under such
circumstances between a monetary policy designed to support the currency and a
monetary policy designed to prop up the domestic economy. At least thus far
the United States' situation in this regard is not yet so constraining as, for
example, Britain's was during the l95Os and 1960s, when repeated ad hoc
concessions were necessary to avert the eruption of a "sterling crisis." Even
so, the problem of formulating and implementing U.S. monetary policy is now
more complicated by one more dimension.
Vacuum at the Center?
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that there is now a conceptual
vacuum at the center of the U.S. monetary policymaking process. The seemingly
endless quest from various quarters to impose some kind of simple rule on the
conduct of monetary policy is, at least for now, no longer a going concern.
The interactions among money, income and prices during the 1980s -- including
the half-decade that followed the monetary targets experiment, even more than
what happened during 1979-82 -- haveundermined it both intellectually and
practically. The claim that reliance on some kind of simple rule would open
the way to costless disinflation is at best unproven, and for practical
purposes dubious. The notion that some kind of simple rule would adequately
encompass the new complications due to the increased practical importance of
the U.S. economy's openness is dubious at best. In retrospect, the
contemptuous dismissal by some economists of the Federal Reserve's reluctance
to adopt the monetary policy rules they had proposed -- andthe readily voiced-24-
assumption that that reluctance could have stemmed only from ignorance or a
faulty set of objectives on the part of Federal Reserve officials, or perhaps
even their self-aggrandizement at the public expense -- standsas a sorry
reminder that economists outside government can also make each of these errors.
The most powerful element of what has happened in this regard in the l980s
is the collapse of the longer-run relationship between money on the one side
and income and prices on the other. In this decade the main event has been
very different from the quarter-to-quarter or even year-to-year irregularity
that was always the focus of debate about whether these relationships were
stable before. Proponents of simple monetary policy rules in the past could
and did claim that such rules failed to offset short-run economic fluctuations
that policy could probably not hope to eliminate anyway, but that over longer
horizons the anchor they provided would keep the economy on a steadier course
than an alternative policy that attempted to achieve "fine tuning." With
nominal GNP by mid 1987 more than 40% below the value implied by the long-run
relationship to Ml which prevailed during 1959-80, the problem is no longer in
the fine tuning but in the anchor itself.
The relevant issue here for policy purposes is not whether for any time
interval there exists some abstract notion of "money" that conceptually bears a
stable and reliable relation to income and prices, and that statisticians can
seek to uncover after that interval ends, but whether policymakers can identify
and measure that quantity substantially in advance of their need to base
planing and operating decisions on it. Appeals to the traditionof the
"quantity theory" are of no use in this context in the absence of aclear
statement of what is the quantity and what is the theory. Especiallyin a
world of institutions that increasingly blur the distinction between
transactions balances and saving balances, being precise about either the-25-
theory or the quantity is ever more difficult. The continuing (indeed
increasing) interest within the economics profession in some kind of
Constitutional constraint on monetary policy jars harshly against the
likelihood of what such constraints suggested (but not enacted) in years past
would have meant in the 1980s.
Nor is the problem merely one of money (or credit) "targets." The more
flexible idea that such variables as money and credit, which are endogamous to
the monetary policy process in the short run, should be used as "information
variables" to guide the initial setting and ultimate readjustment of whatever
genuinely exogenous instrument the central bank is using, has always seemed
high attractive -- atleast to me. The information-variable approach to
monetary policy makes no sense, however, in the absence of a reasonably compact
set of variables that reliable provide information about the macroeconomic
outcomes monetary policy is seeking to affect. After the experience of the
1980s, it is difficult to foresee any ready consensus on what that compact set
of variables should be. Subsequent experience may provide a new basis for such
a consensus, and new data to substantiate it; but that prospect remains a
matter for the future, if not later still.
In the meanwhile, the Federal Reserve System has not ceased operations.
Nor should it be inclined to do so, in light of the performance of both income
and prices during the past half-decade. Five years of fairly steady economic
growth, with inflation consistently lower than at any time since before the
Viet Nam War, represents no small achievement by today's standards. In the
world of practical affairs, it is difficult to argue with success.
Notwithstanding the Federal Reserve's continuing formulation of money
growth targets that it reports to Congress, as current law requires, and even
notwithstanding the relatively high success rate in meeting the target for M2,-26-
it seems clear enough that the Federal Reserve System since mid 1982 has
centered its monetary policy actions primarily around controlling short-term
nominal interest races.29 In so doing, Federal Reserve decision makers have
no doubt taken account of the movements of money (and perhaps credit, too); but
they have also taken account of many other potential information sources,
including longer-term asset prices and yields, dollar exchange rates, and
numerous aspects of nonfinancial economic activity. More to the point, they
have apparently proceeded in the absence of any well articulated conceptual
framework linking the interest rate as the chief policy instrument to the main
macroeconomic policy objectives, or linking the associated large and diverse
information base to either the policy instrument or the policy objectives.
Although procedures differ in various details, the overall approach is strongly
reminiscent of the practice of the l950s and l960s.3°
It is therefore useful to ask why the policy approach followed at that
time failed. The voluminous investigation of this question, both at the time
and subsequently, supported three general conclusions: First, Federal Reserve
officials systematically confused the level of interest rates as the instrument
of monetary policy with the level of interest rates as an ultimate objective of
monetary policy. As a result, they usually delayed too long before raising or
lowering interest rate levels, and even then made changes of insufficient
magnitude. Second, with no nominal quantity at the center of the policy
process, the overall approach lacked an anchor to provide price stability.
Although inflation was not therefore inevitable, there was little protection
against it when various inflationary pressures arose. Third, once inflation
did emerge, Federal Reserve officials (and many other people too) often failed
to distinguish nominal from real interest rates. As a result, they often
associated higher observed interest rates with a tighter policy stance even-27-
when the increase in nominal interest rates merely kept pace with, or even fell
short of, rising inflation expectations.
Are these three flaws inherent in the approach to monetary policy that the
Federal Reserve System followed a quarter-century ago, and that it has
apparently been following again since mid 1982? Or is it possible to design
and implement monetary policy along these lines, albeit in a way that has
learned from the still relatively recent past? Were the familiar failures of
monetary policy under this approach in the past inevitable? Or does the
experience of the last half-decade show that this kind of monetary policy can
work, and work well? Research on these questions may be the best contribution
economists concerned with U.S. monetary policy can now make.Footnotes
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1. The Ml money stock consists of currency, checkable deposits (including
both non-interest-bearing demand deposits and interest-bearing NOW
accounts) and travelers checks; its value as of June 1987 was $747
billion. 42consistsof Ml plus a much larger quantity of savings-type
accounts, including ordinary passbook accounts and certificates of deposit
(in amounts up to $100,000), money market deposit accounts and money
market mutual funds (both of which can have limited checking facilities),
and overnight repurchase agreements and Eurodollars; its June 1987 value
was $2.8 trillion. M3 consists of M2 plus institutionally oriented
instruments like certificates of deposit in amounts over $100,000 and
money market mutual funds used by institutional investors, aswell as
repurchase agreements and Eurodollars extending beyond overnight; itsJune
1987 value was $3.6 trillion.
2. See, for example, De Rosa and Stern (1977) and Lombra and Moran (1980).
3. The official Ml target range for 1979 was 5-8%.
4. Increased short-run volatility of short-term interest rates, as aresult
of no longer accommodating temporary disturbances affecting money demand,
is a straightforward implication of Poole's (1970) analysis of the money
growth target strategy for monetary policy. Whether long-terminterest
rates should be expected to be more or less volatile is a more complicated
question, however, involving changing risk factors and expectationsof
future inflation and interest rates.
5. The 1969 legislation under which the Board acted was quitefar reaching,
empowering the Federal Reserve Board, whenever explicitlyauthorized by
the President, to "prohibit or limit any extensions of creditunder any
circumstances the Board deems appropriate." In 1980 the Board proceeded
under this authority to impose special reserve-type requirements on
increases in certain kinds of consumer credit by all lenders (including
non-banks), on increases in deposits at money market mutualfunds, and on
increases in non-deposit liabilities at banks that were notmembers of the
Federal Reserve System.
6. In 1983 the stated target range for M2 growth covered only part
of the
year.
7. The standard reference to state first is the contrastbetween the findings
in Goldfeld (1973) and Goldfeld (1976). The most widelyread studies done
at the time by the Federal Reserve's own staff includeEnzler et al.
(1976), Porter et al. (1979), and Simpson and Porter (1980).8. Judd and Scadding (1982).
9. The series plotted is the ratio of Ml, as a quarterly average of monthly
data (source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) to
quarterly GNP at annual rates (source: U.S. Department of Commerce).
Both series are seasonally adjusted.
10. I owe the analogy to William Bennett.
11, The specific results cited here are from Goldfeld (forthcoming), which
also provides an extensive survey. Roley (1985) also showed the results
of experimenting with a wide variety of alternative specifications.
12. See, for example, the differing results reported in Friedman (1986),
Eichenbaum and Singleton (1986), and Stock and Watson (1987).
13. Friedman (1984).
14.Theentries above the lines differ from Friedman's because of subsequent
data revisions, but the differences are slight.
15. Friedman made the same prediction more forcefully in pieces directed at
broader audiences. In a column in the September 26, 1983 issue of
Newsweek, for example, Friedman wrote, "Inflation has not yet
accelerated. That will come next year, since it generally takes about two
yearsfor monetary acceleration to work its way through to inflation
The monetary explosion from July 1982 to July 1983 leaves no satisfactory
way out of our present situation. .. Theresult is bound to be renewed
stagflation -- recessionaccompanied by using inflation and high interest
rates." A lengthy interview in the March 19, 1984 issue of Fortune
indicated that Friedman "...alsosees a strong possibility that by the
end of [1984} inflation could reach an annual rate as high as 9%."
16.See, for example, Friedman (1982, 1983).
17. There are several obvious problems with attempting to measure the relevant
concept of credit in this way. One is simply that the available data
measure long-term debts at par value rather than at market prices (or some
equivalent for nonmarketable debts). Another is that although the
category of "nonfinancial" borrowers excludes any entity explicitly set up
as a financial intermediaries, there is inevitably some degree of
double-counting due to what amounts to financial intermediation carried
out by ordinary businesses and even individuals. Whether this problem is
more or less severe than comparable problems affecting the monetary
aggregates --forexample, the apparently widespread use of U.S. currency
in black markets around the world, or even in the United States for a
variety of purposes not related to familiar theories of demand for money
-- isan empirical question.
18. The data are analogous to those in Figure 2 except that the numerator is
end of quarter outstanding debt of domestic nonfinancial borrowers
(source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).19. The one exception is the farm sector.
20. Friedman (1987).
21. For the five years 1978-82, the simple correlations among the
fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates of the major M's were each
negative:
-.53between Ml and M2, -.57between Ml and M3, and -.12
between M2 and M3.
22. Okun (1978).
23. A "point year" of unemployment is one percentage point of unemployment in
excess of the rate that corresponds to "full employment," maintained for
one year. Some writers -- forexample, Fischer (1985) -- havefocused on
real output rather than unemployment, and have argued on that basis that
the post-1980 disinflation involved smaller costs than Okun's survey
implied. The focus of the evidence that Okun surveyed was the
inflation-unemployment relationship, however. His translation of the cost
estimate into foregone real output simply relied on the usual
three-for-one "Okun's Law" relation, which has not held up during the
1980s.
24. See, for example, Sachs (1985) for an analysis of the importance of the
dollar's appreciation in the U.S. disinflation.
25. See Solomon (1986) for a- review of the nineteenth century experience.
26. The official accounts include numerous obvious mismeasurements, but there
is no ground for claiming that their sum is very different from zero. The
largest adjustments in favor of the United States in a set of true
accounts would be the revaluation of U.S. gold stocks, and of the net of
U.S. direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in the United
States, to current market values. The largest adjustments against the
United States would be the revaluation to market value of U.S. banks'
loans to developing countries, and allowance for the accumulation over
time of each year's "errors and omissions" flow.
27. These data are from Scholl (1987), Table 1.
28. The effect is analogous to that sometimes claimed along the lines that
open market purchases would lead investors to sell long-term bonds Outof
fear that the resulting increase in money growth would bring higher
inflation. Market experience in the United States has not borne out this
earlier line of reasoning, but there appears to be more evidence to
support the effect operating via exchange rates.
29. See Wallich (1984) for a description in different but equivalent terms.
30. See, for example, the descriptions given by Srunner and Meltzer (1964) and
Guttentag (1966).References
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